By Tony Lee and Jerry Pierce.
So, you are surfing the web, checking your email, and performing other daily tasks… $#@!, you just realized you clicked a link, opened an attachment, or visited a site that you probably should not have. So what do you do? Cry a little or take action?
Perhaps a friend, family member or neighbor approaches you and asks you to help them “fix their computer” or they say, “I think I have been hacked!”
Whatever the scenario, we have outlined some steps--using native Windows binaries--that you can follow in order to do a little preliminary analysis to detect potential compromise and triage the system.
Indicators of Compromise Covered
- Processes
- Network Connections
- Common File Locations
- Persistence Mechanisms
- Services
- Registry
- Tasks
- Startup Directory
If your relative/friend or family member is remote, you will most likely have to send the output to a file or have them read it to you (good luck with that if they aren’t technical), but it is a start.
Note: If you cannot coach family members to get to the cmd prompt--all hope may already be lost ;)
Examine Processes
The following command has been natively present in Windows since XP and 2003. It will list the process name, process ID (PID), and other information.
tasklist >> output.txt
Sample Output
C:\>tasklist
Image Name PID Session Name Session# Mem Usage
========================= ====== ================ ======== ============
System Idle Process 0 Console 0 16 K
System 4 Console 0 212 K
smss.exe 604 Console 0 404 K
csrss.exe 652 Console 0 1,996 K
winlogon.exe 676 Console 0 3,468 K
services.exe 720 Console 0 3,368 K
lsass.exe 732 Console 0 5,972 K
svchost.exe 892 Console 0 4,764 K
svchost.exe 960 Console 0 4,164 K
svchost.exe 1072 Console 0 19,276 K
svchost.exe 1132 Console 0 3,484 K
svchost.exe 1272 Console 0 3,064 K
explorer.exe 1408 Console 0 15,252 K
VMwareUser.exe 1648 Console 0 2,888 K
ctfmon.exe 1660 Console 0 3,004 K
wracing.exe 1680 Console 0 1,220 K
sqlmangr.exe 1692 Console 0 4,804 K
svchost.exe 1808 Console 0 3,700 K
inetinfo.exe 1864 Console 0 7,904 K
sqlservr.exe 1880 Console 0 7,768 K
VMwareService.exe 128 Console 0 2,236 K
alg.exe 1168 Console 0 3,536 K
cmd.exe 1928 Console 0 2,836 K
defrag.exe 1396 Console 0 3,304 K
dfrgntfs.exe 1260 Console 0 9,556 K
wmiprvse.exe 1756 Console 0 5,876 K
firefox.exe 380 Console 0 24,852 K
tasklist.exe 1284 Console 0 4,312 K
Once the command has been executed a well trained eye can usually spot an oddly named program that is running, however some malware will try to appear as innocuous as possible and won’t stand out from a process name alone. If something is unfamiliar, there are many sites that can be used to investigate a binary name such as
http://www.processlibrary.com/. (No results from processlibrary.com can be as concerning as a positive bad hit).
ProcessLibrary.com Example
Search results for: wracing.exe
Your search "wracing.exe" did not match any documents.
Make sure the search term was spelled correctly.
Examine Network Connections
The following command has been natively present in Windows for ages, however the -o option has been available since at least Windows XP and 2003. The -o option provides the PID of the process that is holding the port open. This PID can be cross referenced with the process information that you pulled in the previous section to examine the process name that is holding the port open.
netstat -ano >> output.txt
Sample Output
C:\>netstat -ano
Active Connections
Proto Local Address Foreign Address State PID
TCP 0.0.0.0:21 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 1864
TCP 0.0.0.0:80 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 1864
TCP 0.0.0.0:135 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 960
TCP 0.0.0.0:443 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 1864
TCP 0.0.0.0:445 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4
TCP 0.0.0.0:1029 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 1864
TCP 127.0.0.1:1030 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 1168
TCP 127.0.0.1:1737 127.0.0.1:1738 ESTABLISHED 380
TCP 127.0.0.1:1738 127.0.0.1:1737 ESTABLISHED 380
TCP 127.0.0.1:1741 127.0.0.1:1742 ESTABLISHED 380
TCP 127.0.0.1:1742 127.0.0.1:1741 ESTABLISHED 380
TCP 192.168.200.53:139 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4
TCP 192.168.200.53:1743 74.125.239.18:80 ESTABLISHED 380
TCP 192.168.200.53:1745 74.125.239.18:80 ESTABLISHED 380
TCP 192.168.200.53:1746 72.235.63.10:80 ESTABLISHED 380
TCP 192.168.200.53:1747 72.235.63.19:80 ESTABLISHED 380
TCP 192.168.200.53:1749 74.125.239.6:80 ESTABLISHED 380
TCP 192.168.200.53:1750 63.232.79.43:443 ESTABLISHED 1680
UDP 0.0.0.0:445 *:* 4
UDP 0.0.0.0:500 *:* 732
UDP 0.0.0.0:3456 *:* 1864
UDP 0.0.0.0:4500 *:* 732
UDP 127.0.0.1:123 *:* 1072
UDP 192.168.200.53:123 *:* 1072
UDP 192.168.200.53:137 *:* 4
UDP 192.168.200.53:138 *:*
You are looking for any “odd” port that is listening as this might indicate the malware has placed a backdoor onto your system, or any connections to odd sites/locations around the world which you haven’t initiated.
We realize that netstat -anb can provide even more information to include the libraries that are associated with the PID, however this takes longer to run and may not be allowed to run without elevating the prompt in Windows 7.
Examine Common File Locations
The following command has been natively present in Windows since the dawn of time, however the options may not be well known to you or your family members. Running the “dir” command with the following syntax will produce a listing that is sorted by the file creation time.
System32
Many files are located here and thus this is a common place for malware to hide among the weeds
dir /o:d /t:c c:\windows\system32 >> output.txt
Sample Output
C:\>dir /o:d /t:c c:\windows\system32
-snip-
01/07/2010 05:48 PM 689,152 xpsp3res.dll
01/07/2010 06:02 PM <DIR> en
01/07/2010 06:02 PM <DIR> scripting
01/07/2010 06:02 PM <DIR> en-us
01/07/2010 06:19 PM 1,676,288 xpssvcs.dll
01/07/2010 06:19 PM 575,488 xpsshhdr.dll
01/07/2010 06:19 PM 117,760 prntvpt.dll
01/07/2010 06:20 PM <DIR> XPSViewer
01/07/2010 06:34 PM 2,560 xpsp4res.dll
01/07/2010 07:39 PM 25,966,024 MRT.exe
01/07/2010 07:50 PM 3,706 TZLog.log
2009 File(s) 408,261,849 bytes
52 Dir(s) 2,505,060,352 bytes free
User’s home directory
This is a popular spot for malware to hide because the attacker has permission to write to these locations under the context of the user.
dir /a /s /o:d /t:c “%USERPROFILE%” >> output.txt
Sample Output
dir /a /s /o:d /t:c "%USERPROFILE%"
-SNIP-
Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temp
01/07/2010 07:00 PM 54,272 Set29F.tmp
01/07/2010 07:42 PM <DIR> NDP1.1sp1-KB953297-X86
01/07/2010 07:47 PM 14,010 ASPNETSetup_00002.log
09/13/2010 09:24 PM 8,141 lick_me.jpg
09/13/2010 09:24 PM 37,376 wracing.exe
09/13/2010 09:24 PM 28,160 wracing.dll
09/13/2010 09:28 PM <DIR> plugtmp
03/23/2012 01:43 PM <DIR> VMwareDnD
03/23/2012 02:54 PM 104 pdracing.tmp
-SNIP-
The filenames above are from real malware--we did not make those up.
Investigating Persistence
Sometimes the persistence mechanism (the way malware tries to assure its continued existence on a system) can give away the presence of malicious software on a system. The following persistence mechanisms will be examined:
- Services
- Registry
- Scheduled Tasks
- Startup Directory
Examine Services
The following command has been natively present in Windows since before the dawn of time. This command is commonly used to list the started services.
net start >> output.txt
Sample Output
C:\>net start
These Windows services are started:
Application Layer Gateway Service
Automatic Updates
COM+ Event System
Computer Browser
Cryptographic Services
DCOM Server Process Launcher
DHCP Client
Distributed Link Tracking Client
DNS Client
Event Log
FTP Publishing
Help and Support
IIS Admin
IPSEC Services
Logical Disk Manager
MSSQLSERVER
Network Connections
Network Location Awareness (NLA)
Plug and Play
Protected Storage
Remote Access Connection Manager
Remote Procedure Call (RPC)
Remote Registry
Secondary Logon
Security Accounts Manager
Security Center
Server
Shell Hardware Detection
System Event Notification
Task Scheduler
TCP/IP NetBIOS Helper
Telephony
Terminal Services
VMware Tools Service
WebClient
Windows Firewall/Internet Connection Sharing (ICS)
Windows Management Instrumentation
Windows Time
Workstation
World Wide Web Publishing
The command completed successfully.
The following command has been natively present in Windows since XP and 2003. It will list the process name, process ID (PID), and the keyname for the service.
tasklist /svc >> output.txt
Sample Output
C:\>tasklist /svc
Image Name PID Services
========================= ====== ============================================
System Idle Process 0 N/A
System 4 N/A
smss.exe 604 N/A
csrss.exe 652 N/A
winlogon.exe 676 N/A
services.exe 720 Eventlog, PlugPlay
lsass.exe 732 PolicyAgent, ProtectedStorage, SamSs
svchost.exe 892 DcomLaunch, TermService
svchost.exe 960 RpcSs
svchost.exe 1072 Browser, CryptSvc, Dhcp, dmserver,
EventSystem, helpsvc, lanmanserver,
lanmanworkstation, Netman, Nla, RasMan,
Schedule, seclogon, SENS, SharedAccess,
ShellHWDetection, TapiSrv, TrkWks, W32Time,
winmgmt, wscsvc, wuauserv
svchost.exe 1132 Dnscache
svchost.exe 1272 LmHosts, RemoteRegistry
explorer.exe 1408 N/A
VMwareUser.exe 1648 N/A
ctfmon.exe 1660 N/A
wracing.exe 1680 N/A
sqlmangr.exe 1692 N/A
svchost.exe 1808 WebClient
inetinfo.exe 1864 IISADMIN, MSFtpsvc, W3SVC
sqlservr.exe 1880 MSSQLSERVER
VMwareService.exe 128 VMTools
alg.exe 1168 ALG
cmd.exe 1928 N/A
firefox.exe 380 N/A
notepad.exe 1344 N/A
tasklist.exe 1820 N/A
wmiprvse.exe 1892 N/A
Additional analysis could include digging further into a particular service shown above. A great native tool for this is sc (service control):
sc qc >> output.txt
Sample Output
C:\>sc qc webclient
[SC] GetServiceConfig SUCCESS
SERVICE_NAME: webclient
TYPE : 10 WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
START_TYPE : 2 AUTO_START
ERROR_CONTROL : 1 NORMAL
BINARY_PATH_NAME : C:\WINDOWS\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService
LOAD_ORDER_GROUP : NetworkProvider
TAG : 0
DISPLAY_NAME : WebClient
DEPENDENCIES : MRxDAV
SERVICE_START_NAME : NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
Examine Registry Entries
The following command has been natively present in Windows for quite some time--however, the keys are the ones examined by Sysinternal’s autoruns:
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components"
reg query "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
Sample Output
C:\>reg query "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
! REG.EXE VERSION 3.0
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
ctfmon.exe REG_SZ C:\WINDOWS\system32\ctfmon.exe
wracing REG_SZ C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temp\wracing.exe -installkys
With this sample output, we see that “wracing.exe” is in the “C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temp” directory. We suggest you review the file listing of this directory, sorted by file creation time as well to see what other artifacts may be present from the same timeframe.
Examine Scheduled Tasks
The following command has been natively present in Windows for quite a while, however it is falling out of favor in Windows 7 and 2008:
at >> output.txt
Sample Output
C:\>at
There are no entries in the list.
Windows 7 and 2008 prefers the following newer command:
schtasks >> output.txt
Sample Output
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator>schtasks
TaskName Next Run Time Status
=================================== ====================== ===============
Ezyme 16:33:00, 3/23/2012
Examine Startup Directory
We will use the ‘dir’ command again in order to inspect the startup directory specifically:
dir “C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Start Menu\Programs\Startup”
dir “C:\Documents and Settings\\Start Menu\Programs\Startup”
dir "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"
Sample Output
C:\>dir "c:\documents and settings\Administrator\start menu\programs\startup"
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 442E-ACB9
Directory of c:\documents and settings\Administrator\start menu\programs\startup
11/15/2006 01:37 PM <DIR> .
11/15/2006 01:37 PM <DIR> ..
11/15/2006 01:37 PM 607 putbginfo.bat.lnk
1 File(s) 607 bytes
2 Dir(s) 2,503,716,864 bytes free
Initial Analysis of the Results
Analysis often takes far longer than the time required to run the commands. However, according to the sample information above, it appears that we have at least two infections on this host. The data below ties everything together.
Malicious software is present in the process list here:
Image Name PID Session Name Session# Mem Usage
========================= ====== ================ ======== ============
wracing.exe 1680 Console 0 1,220 K
It also has a connection out to a known bad site:
TCP 192.168.200.53:1750 63.232.79.43:443 ESTABLISHED 1680
Malicious files are present in the following directory:
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temp
09/13/2010 09:24 PM 8,141 lick_me.jpg
09/13/2010 09:24 PM 37,376 wracing.exe
09/13/2010 09:24 PM 28,160 wracing.dll
The persistence mechanism is via the registry:
"HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
wracing REG_SZ C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temp\wracing.exe -installkys
There is also a second (most likely unrelated) suspicious task that runs via the scheduler:
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator>schtasks
TaskName Next Run Time Status
=================================== ====================== ===============
Ezyme 16:33:00, 3/23/2012
Food for Thought
If the infection is using rootkit technology, there is a good chance that the native Windows tools will not show you anything. If nothing shows up as indicators of compromise, but they are still convinced they are owned--look for our next post (Am I P0wn3d? Lesson 102 - Windows *Non-Native* Tool Triage) which leverages non-native tools which may provide more insight into the potential breach. Non-native tools may also pull the same information, without using the traditional Windows APIs which can help discover the present of rootkit technology. Happy hunting!
What Native Tips Do You Have?
Do you have any tips or tricks using
Native Windows tools? Share them in the comments below!!!
